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A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee:
Environmental Law Under Close Scrutiny
WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR.*
In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the
District of Columbia Circuit in two cases that closely scrutinized
decisions of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and, in so doing,
questioned settled habits of judicial review of administrative action
affecting the environment. In this article Professor Rodgers analyzes
four implications of Vermont Yankee-substantive judicial review
under the National Environmental Policy Act, judicial imposition of
procedures upon agencies beyond the statutory minima of the
Administrative Procedure Act, the obligation of the agencies to
consider alternatives in the environmental impact statement without
regard to the initiative of the parties, and the scope of alternatives
properly addressed in the impact statement. Professor Rodgers
concludes that Vermont Yankee is out of step with the dominant
strains of the close scrutiny doctrine and, for this reason, suggests
that the decision is likely to be isolated and confined.
Of the many bolts from the blue delivered by the Supreme Court last Term,
one in particular has riveted the attention of those who follow that specialized
body of administrative principles called environmental law.1 In Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.2 the
*Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A. 1961, Harvard University; LL.B. 1965,
Columbia University. This article is an elaboration of remarks presented to the Judicial Conference of the
District of Columbia Circuit on May 23, 1978.
The author expresses appreciation to his colleagues, Professor Steven P. Goldberg and Professor Roy A.
Schotland of the Georgetown University Law Center, and to Professor Peter L. Strauss of the Columbia
University Law School, who offered comments on an earlier draft of this article. The views expressed here,
of course, are those of the author.
1. Commentary on Vermont Yankee in the Supreme Court and lower courts includes Breyer, Vermont
Yankee and the Courts' Role in the Nuclear Energy Controversy, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1833 (1978); Byse,
Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure: A Somewhat Different View, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1823 (1978); Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure, 91 HARV. L.
RaV. 1805 (1978); Note, The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and Nuclear Power Plant
Licensing: Judicial Modification of Agency Rulemaking-Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 26 DE PAUL L. REV. 666 (1977); Comment, Implementing the National
Environmental Policy Act Through Rulemaking: The Implications of Natural Defense Council, Inc. v.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 148 (1977); Comment, Judicial Review of Generic
Rulemaking: The Experience of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 65 GEO. L.J. 1295 (1977). On the
administrative procedures involved in nuclear power plant licensing, see Note, The Use of Generic
Rulemaking to Resolve Environmental Issues in Nuclear Power Plant Licensing, 61 VA. L. REV. 869 (1975);
Comment, AEC Rulemaking and Public Participation, 62 GEO. L.J. 1737 (1974). On the general subject of
environmental law, see W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1977).
2. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
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Court, in a unanimous opinion 3 written by Mr. Justice Rehnquist, reversed
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in
two cases that closely scrutinized decisions of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. The lower court decisions invalidated the grant of nuclear
power plant licenses because of the Commission's failure to weigh and
document environmental effects. In one, the lower court's remand to the
agency was grounded chiefly on a perceived failure to consider fully the
energy conservation alternative to Consumers Power Company's nuclear
reactors.4 In the other, the remand was thought to be in order because the
agency inadequately considered in a rulemaking and a licensing proceeding
involving Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation the environmental
effect of fuel reprocessing and disposal.5
In reversing, the Supreme Court delivered a sharp rebuke to the rationales
of the decisions below, and seized upon the occasion to question settled habits
of judicial review of administrative action affecting the environment. The
Court recognized that under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
the environmental impact of spent nuclear fuel processes was a proper subject
of consideration by the Commission when licensing nuclear reactors. 6 But the
Court disapproved of the decision below in the Vermont Yankee case, which
invalidated the Commission's spent fuel cycle rule because of procedural
deficiencies.7 The Court stated:
[N]othing in the [Administrative Procedure Act], NEPA, the
circumstances of this case, the nature of the issues being consid-
ered, past agency practice, or the statutory mandate under which
the Commission operates permitted the court to review and
overturn the rulemaking proceeding on the basis of the procedural
devices employed (or not employed) by the Commission so long as
the Commission employed at least the statutory minima, a matter
about which there is no doubt in this case.
8
Next, the Supreme Court aligned itself with prior authority9 recognizing that
the range of alternatives considered in an environmental impact statement
(EIS) "must be bounded by some notion of feasibility." 10 The Court thus held
that the Commission properly declined to investigate the energy conservation
alternative because the intervenors in the Consumers Power case had failed to
make a showing " 'sufficient to require reasonable minds to inquire fur-
ther.' "I' The Court explicitly repudiated the lower court's view that the
Commission's threshold test placed heavy substantive burdens on inter-
3. Mr. Justice Blackmun and Mr. Justice Powell did not take part in the consideration or decision of
these cases. Id. at 558.
4. Aeschliman v. NRC, 547 F.2d 622, 629-30 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
5. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
6. 435 U.S. at 539.
7. Id. at 540-41.
8. Id. at 548.
9. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 837-38 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
10. 435 U.S. at 551.
11. Id. at 554 (quoting Consumers Power Co., 7 A.E.C. 19, 32 n.27 (1974)).
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venors, 12 and condemned aspects of the decision below as "Kafkaesque"13 and
"judicial intervention run riot."' 4 The Supreme Court expressed its umbrage
in a peroration that included these observations:
Nuclear energy may some day be a cheap, safe source of power or it
may not. But Congress has made a choice to at least try nuclear
energy, establishing a reasonable review process in which courts
are to play only a limited role. The fundamental policy questions
appropriately resolved in Congress and in the state legislatures are
not subject to reexamination in the federal courts under the guise of
judicial review of agency action. Time may prove wrong the
decision to develop nuclear energy, but it is Congress or the States
within their appropriate agencies which must eventually make that
judgment. In the meantime courts should perform their appointed
function. NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals of the
Nation, but its mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural. 15
This article addresses four of the many provocative implications of
Vermont Yankee: (1) substantive judicial review under NEPA; (2) judicial
imposition of procedures upon agencies beyond the statutory minima of the
Administrative Procedure Act; (3) the obligation of the agencies to consider
alternatives in the environmental impact statement without regard to the
initiative of the parties; and (4) the scope of alternatives properly addressed in
the EIS. This analysis of Vermont Yankee will be prefaced by a discussion of
various institutional techniques and doctrines that assure greater accounta-
bility in administrative decisionmaking. Prominent among these is the hard
look doctrine of judicial review to which the agencies must answer in their
environmental judgments.
ADMINISTRATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE HARD LOOK DOCTRINE
Stepping back for the moment from the specifics of Vermont Yankee, it
seems clear that we live in an age of hostility to the administrative process.
The current resident of the White House waged his successful presidential
campaign against the faceless bureaucrat and his mindless organization
charts.16 Being alien to the federal government, we are told, is an important
ingredient of electoral success. 17 Red tape is the subject of organized attack.' 8
12. Id.; see Aeschliman v. NRC, 547 F.2d 622, 627 & n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
13. 435 U.S. at 557.
14. Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner Consumers Power at 37).
15. Id. at 557-58.
16. See Havemann, And Now for Something Completely Different, 8 NAT'L J. 1585, 1586 (1976)(theme
that federal bureaucracy was "a mess" was hammered home successfully in Carter presidential campaign).
17. See Bonafede, Carter's Long Journey Ends in Victory on a Long Night, 8 NAT'L J. 1582, 1582-83
(1978) (anti-Washington populist campaign contributed to Carter victory).
18. See SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINEss, THE FEDERAL PAPERWORK BURDEN, S. REP.
No. 125, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1973) (federal red tape reaching crisis proportions in terms of costs of
compliance with reporting requirements and growing citizen distrust of government); President's
Memorandum for Heads of Executive Dep'ts and Agencies, Reduction in Reports Required of the
American Public, 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 212 (Feb. 16, 1977) (requiring agency or departmew
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The deregulators are riding high. 19 The media and the public feast on
bureaucratic gaffes highlighted in memos of the month 20 and golden fleece
awards.2' Last summer, Californians voted to stop paying the bills,22 a rather
clear indicator of dissatisfaction with services rendered.
Discontent about administrative performance brings retaliation aimed at
enforcing increased accountability and curtailing excesses. Not all of these
gestures are successful, of course, although some probably are.23 Revival of
the delegation doctrine has been suggested as a means for reasserting a degree
of control over the unencumbered meanderings of administrative decision-
makers. 24 The theory receives occasional support in the state courts in natural
resources and environmental cases, 25 and the policies behind it are reflected in
heads to determine how their reports can be simplified or eliminated). See generally The Federal Paperwork
Burden: Hearings Before The Subcomm. on Gov't Regulation of the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business,
Part 6, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), Part 5, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), Part 1, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
19. See, e.g., MacAvoy, The Outlook for Regulation, 45 ANTITRUST L.J. 186, 186 (1976) (regulatory
reform fashionable across country and enjoys bipartisan support); Shenefield, Regulation and Deregula-
tion-Where Do We Stand, 45 ANTITRuST L.J. 244,246-47 (1976) (inflation, fuel shortages, and reduction
in quantity and quality of services causes dissatisfaction with regulated economy). But see Stewart, The
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1689-93 (1975) (natural
monopolies and broadcasting require regulation; while transportation deregulation ideal, opposition from
benefactors of status quo may dictate "second best" solution of merely lessening degree of administrative
control).
20. Featured in the Washington Monthly.
21. Featured in Press Releases of Senator William Proxmire. See Nelson, The Senator's Golden Egg,
Wash. Post, Sept. 24, 1978, Magazine at 20; Satchell, The Award No One Wants, Parade, July 9, 1978, at
14.
22. The reference, of course, is to the vote on Proposition 13. See CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA (initiative
enacted by voters in June 1978; limits property assessment and taxing powers of state and local
governments); Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208
583 P.2d 1283, 1301-02, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 259 (1978) (upholding article XIIIA as constitutional).
23. An almost certain failure, because of the immensity of its target, will be President Carter's campaign
to require agency regulations to be written in comprehensible English. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43
Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978) (requiring simple, clear, and unburdensome regulations through advance public
notice of regulations under consideration, approval by agency directors of significant regulations, and
periodic review of existing regulations); President's Remarks and Question-and-Answer Session with Dcp't
of Labor Employees, 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 161, 164-65 (Feb. 9, 1977) (promoting minimal,
clear, and well-written regulations through individual accountability of Cabinet officers).
Indeed, the situation is so desperate that the New York legislature has decreed that consumer contracts
be written in "plain English." N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702 (McKinney Supp. 1978-79). This is,
unfortunately, a language infrequently taught in the public schools of the country, and rarely spoken or
written in the law schools.
24. Wright, Book Review, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 582-87 (1972) (advocating revival of delegation doctrine to
check unbounded administrative discretion; Congress should delegate power only with prospective
guidelines and standards for agency to follow).
25. E.g., Bayside Timber Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 20 Cal. App. 3d1, 11-15, 97 Cal. Rptr. 431, 437-
40 (1971) (portion of statute permitting timber industry to regulate itself held unconstitutional because it
contained no standards); Cross Key Waterways v. Askew, 351 So. 2d 1062, 1071 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)
(invalidating sections of statute delegating discretionary authority to state commission to designate parts of
state "areas of critical concern"); Humane Soc'y v. New Jersey State Fish & Game Council, 129 N.J.
Super. 239, 246-47, 322 A.2d 841, 845 (1974) (standards accompanying delegation to Fish and Game
Council held sufficient so that delegation not unconstitutional); Washington v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.,
No. C-1907, slip op. at 4 (Wash. Super. Ct., Pacific County, July 15, 1978) (declaring unconstitutional
statute giving agency power to set conditions on instream construction projects because legislature did not
specify standards or procedural safeguards).
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firmly established theories such as the public trust doctrine.26 At the federal
level, however, despite its appeal, the delegation doctrine remains in full
disrepute, with little chance of revival.2 7
Congress in recent years has moved comprehensively to open up, and in the
process improve, agency decisionmaking. Although few were aware of it at
the time, enactment of the Freedom of Information Act has revolutionized
discovery practice in administrative proceedings.28 The Advisory Committee
Act has had a similar, if less comprehensive, effect.29 Sunshine30 and sunset3'
laws also are parts of the administrative environment that has brought outside
scrutiny to bear upon agency judgments.
Perhaps most important, Congress now seeks to regain control lost
through earlier legislative delegations by after-the-fact review mechanisms,
such as reporting requirements, 32 one-house vetoes, 33 and similar variations. 34
This legislative second guessing is subject to criticism, even serious constitu-
26. Recognizing that some natural resources are held in trust by government for public benefit, the
public trust doctrine demands that a court "look with considerable skepticism" upon action restricting
public use. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68
MICH. L. REV. 471, 490 (1970). Only a direct and explicit legislative narrowing of the use of natural
resources will be honored. See, e.g., Robbins v. Department of Pub. Works, 355 Mass. 328, 331, 244
N.E.2d 577, 580 (1969) (legislation should express both plan for new use and intent to forgo existing use).
See generally W. RODGERS, supra note 1, § 2.16(b).
27. See Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 559 (1976) (wide
delegation to President to restrict imports that "threaten to impair national security" upheld as clearly
sufficient to meet challenge under delegation doctrine).
28. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976); Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38,
68-69 (1975).
29. See Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. § 10(b) (1976) (assuring public access to records that
were made available to or prepared for advisory committees).
30. See 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1976); Memorandum from the President for Heads of Departments and
Agencies on Government in the Sunshine Act, 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1068, 1068 (June 9,
1978) (instructing agencies not to close meetings or defend closed meetings without strong justification).
31. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-104 (Supp. 1976) (legislature must periodically audit and hold
public hearings on each state agency before deciding whether to terminate, continue, or reestablish agency);
TEXAS REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5429K (Vernon Supp. 1978) (advisory commission must annually
review certain state agencies and recommend to Governor and legislature abolition, continuation, or
reorganization of each agency); SENATE COMM. ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION, THE PROGRAM
REAUTHORIZATION AND EVALUATION ACT OF 1978, S. REP. No. 981, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978)
(proposal for federal sunset law).
32. E.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136w(a)(3) (1976) (requiring advance notice to agricultural committees of proposed
and final EPA regulations affecting pesticide use); Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, §
204(a), 43 U.S.C.A. § 1714(c)(2) (West Supp. 1978) (requiring detailed explanation to relevant committees
of private use of large plots of federal land affected by withdrawal orders, including environmental impact
and list of alternatives).
33. See Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1063 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (en banc) (per curiam) (plurality
opinion) (majority of court upheld one-house veto in Federal Salary Act of 1967 against constitutional
attack), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978). See generally Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of
Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1369 (1977); McGowan,
Congress, Court, and Control of Delegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1119, 1133-62(1977).
34. See, e.g., Alaska Natural Gas Transportation Act of 1976, § 10(c)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 719h(c)(3) (1976)
(congressional approval of President's choice of route for the Alaska gas pipeline conclusive as to the legal
and factual sufficiency of President's environmental impact statement); Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of
1978, § 304(b), (c), Pub. L. No. 95-242, 92 Stat. 134 (1978) (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 2154(b),(c))
(executive order authorizing expedited NRC export license subject to congressional disapproval).
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tional objection, 35 as a poor substitute for writing legislation with intelligible
guidelines in the first place. But the growth of the practice is encouraged by
strong currents. Congress is at its best as a counterpuncher-delegating
authority, then lying in wait as constituent anguish brings into focus
administrative overreaching. The one-house veto variations add bite to the
traditional bark of oversight, and are fast becoming acceptable legislative
staples along with the reactive amendment and familiar controls over
appropriations. It is unlikely that a constitutional system that scarcely blinks
at unconscionably broad delegations 36 should find intolerable these piecemeal
legislative attempts to give belated direction to the executive.
37
In the courts, far and away the most important expression of the movement
to reassert systematic control over agency decisionmaking is called the hard
look doctrine of judicial review. This doctrine has been initiated by the
judiciary, principally in the review of notice and comment rulemaking
commonly undertaken in environmental and health and safety regulation. Its
place of origin is the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, 38 although several of its strongest expressions have appeared
elsewhere. 39 It has been embraced and refurbished by the Congress. 40 It goes
by many names--"substantial inquiry," 4' "close scrutiny, '42 and now the
"hard look" according to the Supreme Court's 1976 decision in the Northern
Great Plains Coal Case.43 Every noteworthy phenomenon can use a label; the
35. See President's Message to Congress on Legislative Vetoes, 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 1146,
1147 (June 26, 1978) (legislative vetoes injecting Congress into details of administering substantive
programs and laws infringe on executive's constitutional duty); Bruff& Gellhorn, supra note 33, at 1372-
75; McGowan, supra note 33, at 1149-62.
36. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
37. Cf. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 441 (1977) (upholding congressional
authority over custodian of Nixon tapes through legislative vetoes and express directives).
38. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Leventhal, J.)
(court will uphold agency findings if satisfied agency took "hard look" at issues), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923
(1971); Pikes Peak Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 422 F.2d 671, 682 (D.C. Cir.) (Leventhal, J.) (same), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 979 (1969).
39. E.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,415-16 (1971) (court must make
"substantial inquiry" to determine whether Secretary considered all relevant facts and reasonably believed
no feasible alternative highway routes existed); E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018,
1026 (4th Cir. 1976) (EPA must disclose grounds for rulemaking and fully explain its course of inquiry,
analysis, and reasoning); City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 673, 676 (9th Cir. 1975) (agency decision
that project will have no significant environmental consequences must be reasonable and based on agency's
"best efforts"); South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 655 (Ist Cir. 1974) (court must make
"searching and careful" inquiry into rationality of EPA's air quality plan); Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conference v. FPC (I), 354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1965) (court must determine whether FPC compiled
complete record and considered all relevant facts); accord, Ray v. Mason County Drain Comm'n, 393
Mich. 294, 308-09, 224 N.W.2d 883, 889 (1975) (trial court must make detailed findings of fact in
environmental cases); No Power Line, Inc. v. Minnesota Environmental Quality Council, 262 N.W.2d 312,
331 (Minn. 1977) (en bane) (Yetka, J., concurring) (state environmental agency should act as independent
arm of all citizens, generate evidence of its own, and consider all alternatives to proposed electric power
line).
40. See notes 128-38 infra and accompanying text.
41. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971).
42. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289, 1363 (S.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd and remanded sub nom.
Sierra Club v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1974); W. RODGERS, supra note 1, § 4.12, at 468; id. § 8.7,
at 882.
43. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) (Powell, J.) (court's role to ensure agency has
704
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hard look is as important to the judicial review of technological decisionmak-
ing by administrators as the slam dunk is to professional basketball.
What are the essential ingredients of this hard look taken by the courts at
agency rulemakings? For present purposes, there are three. First is the
substantive component, under which the courts read closely the operative
statute to make sure the agencies stay within the scope of discretion assigned
by Congress.44 Second is the procedural component, under which the courts
have assumed a power to oversee the fairness of agency decisionmaking. In
the pre-Vermont Yankee days, this posture was typified by Judge Leventhal's
decision in International Harvester,45 which was read and understood as
inviting limited rights of cross-examination on "sensitive" subjects arising
during notice and comment rulemaking.4 6
Third, and most important, is the incessant demand of the hard look case
law for reasoned decisionmaking. This occurs in cases in which the adminis-
trator typically acts within the bounds of permissible discretion of the
governing statute, but does a poor job of explaining or justifying the results. In
the parlance of the Administrative Procedure Act, judicial disapproval of
agency rulemaking normally must rest upon the ground that the administra-
tive action was "arbitrary [and] capricious." 47 Courts taking a hard look must
taken "hard look" at environmental consequences) (citing Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Leventhal, J.) (court must ensure that agency has complied
with congressional directive and taken "hard look" at environmental consequences)); see Aberdeen &
R.R.R. Co. v. SCRAP, 422 U.S. 289, 327 n.28 (1975) (no need to resolve court's scope of review of EIS
because ICC adequately gave "hard look"). Kleppe speaks of the agency taking a "hard look" at the
problems before it. 427 U.S. at 410 n.21. Actually, courts take a hard look to make sure the agency has
taken a hard look.
Judicial decisions regularly invoke a variety of hard look formulations while reviewing agency actions,
especially in cases arising under the National Environmental Policy Act. E.g., Culpeper League for
Environmental Protection v. NRC, 574 F.2d 633, 634 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (per curiam) ("hard look");
Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Administration, 12 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1156, 1159 (D. Neb. 1978) ("hard
look"); Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Andrus, I1 Envir. Rep. Cas. 2189, 2197 (D. Minn. 1978) ("in-depth
probe of all circumstances"); Citizen's Comm. for Environmental Protection v. United States Coast Guard,
456 F. Supp. 101, 117 (D.N.J. 1978) ("substantial inquiry"); Monarch Chem. Works, Inc. v. Exon, 452 F.
Supp. 493, 496 (D. Neb. 1978) (court "feels compelled to examine the considerable evidence presented in
detail"); Chautauqua County Environmental Defense Council v. Adams, 452 F. Supp. 376, 380 (W.D.N.Y.
1978) ("hard look"); Chatauqua County Environmental Defense Council v. EPA, 452 F. Supp. 69, 78
(D.N.J. 1978) ("thorough review"); Sierra Club v. Bergland, 451 F. Supp. 120, 128 (N.D. Miss. 1978)
("hard look"); Mack v. Califano, 447 F. Supp. 668, 670 (D.D.C. 1978) ("hard look"); Maryland Nat'l
Capitol Park & Planning Comm'n v. Martin, 447 F. Supp. 350, 353 (D.D.C. 1978) ("hard look"); City of
New Haven v. Chandler, 446 F. Supp. 925, 930 (D. Conn. 1978) ("hard look"); Hiatt Grain & Feed, Inc. v.
Bergland, 446 F. Supp. 457, 478, 490 (D. Kan. 1978) ("searching" inquiry; "hard look").
44. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (1976) (requiring courts to hold unlawful and set aside agency action
unauthorized by statute). Often, the label of substantive judicial review is used to describe the situation in
which the agency action, although within the channels of authority granted by the legislature, is
nonetheless arbitrary and capricious under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). See Oakes, The Judicial Role in
Environmental Law, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 498, 509-10 (1977) (review of agency action based on incomplete
record called "limited substantive review"); note 86 infra.
45. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
46. Id. at 631; see National Asphalt Pavement Ass'n v. Train, 539 F.2d 775, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(procedures beyond APA required in some circumstances); Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the
Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and Empiricial Analysis, 42 U. CHi. L. REV. 401, 402-03 (1975).
47. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976). Of course, the standard normally is whether the agency decision is
supported by "substantial evidence" if the matter under review arose in the context of trial-type procedure.
Id. § 706(2)(E). Most practitioners, and not a few academics, have difficulty understanding why the scope
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become sufficiently acquainted with technical matters in the record to
understand why the agency did what it did.48 The administrator through the
record must be in a position to explain to the court "the reasons why he
chooses to follow one course rather than another. '49 Under the doctrine,
assumptions must be spelled out, inconsistencies explained, methodologies
disclosed, contradictory evidence rebutted, record references solidly ground-
ed, guesswork eliminated and conclusions supported in a "manner capable of
judicial understanding. ' '5o
The hard look doctrine plays no favorites; it is advanced as enthusiastically
by industry as it is by environmentalists. 51 Its acceptance is deep. Its reach is
broad. It is invoked to require disclosures-of the reliability of methodolo-
gy,5 2 of documentation upon which the agency action was based,5 3 of the
standards applied or to be applied in reaching a decision, 54 of the form or
scope of regulation contemplated. 55 It compels the agency to address key
issues-the need for the level of regulation proposed, 56 the cost 57 and
workability58 of the technology required, potential health effects, 5 9 inconsist-
of review is theoretically broader for the litigant who at least had a full procedural opportunity to bring the
agency around to his way of thinking. For a useful general analysis, see Verkuil, Judicial Review of
Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REV. 185 (1974).
48. See South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 666-67 (1st Cir. 1974) (court would abdicate its
function if it did not carefully review agency's key technical determinations).
49. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. 2149, 2156-62 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (agency must explain
standard chosen and validity of underlying data).
50. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018, 1038 (4th Cir. 1976), affd in part and rev'd
in part, 430 U.S. 112 (1977).
51. Many of the strongest statements of the doctrine have occurred in cases involving industry attacks
upon agency rulemakings. See, e.g., id. at 1034, 1035, 1036, 1037, 1039 (chemical industry); Portland
Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393-94 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (cement industry), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 921 (1974); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(automobile industry); Manufacturing Chemists Ass'n v. Costle, 451 F. Supp. 902, 903-04 (W.D. La. 1978)
(chemical industry).
52. See International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (EPA must
show reliability of methodology it used to refute adverse industry data on air pollution control technology).
53. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Blum, 458 F.2d 650, 660 (D.D.C. 1978) (agency must disclose
information received ex parte and used in informal rulemaking when the information bears directly on
complex technical issues and probably will affect outcome); cf. Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 307 & n.30,
308 & n.31 (5th Cir. 1971) (dictum) (court may in future require EPA to disclose documents showing how
agency made certain calculations essential to its decision).
54. See Ford Motor Co. v. EPA, 567 F.2d 661, 671-72 (6th Cir. 1977) (agency must justify permit
decision solely on published policy); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus (DDT II), 439
F.2d 584, 596-97 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (agency must disclose criteria used to grant or deny suspension of
pesticide registration).
55. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1251 & n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (agency must give
sufficient notice of the regulation proposed; impermissible to promulgate rule establishing specific costs
after notice informed parties only that general policy of allocating costs would be considered).
56. See South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 671 (1st Cir. 1974) (agency required to show that
level of air pollution in Boston justifies proposed parking freeze).
57. See Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620, 634 (2d Cir. 1976) (agency's failure to
consider costs unreasonable).
58. Id. (agency's failure to consider feasibility unreasonable).
59. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA (Aldrin-Dieldrin I), 465 F.2d 528, 538 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (agency must explain its decision not to ban immediately known carcinogen as imminent health
hazard).
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ent applications of data.60 It can mandate specific actions-a retracing of the
regulatory steps if the method of calculation is defective and the data relied
upon outdated, 61 a rewriting of vague and hortatory guidelines to make them
specific, 62 a fashioning of exemptions to deal with hardship cases. 63 The
doctrine shows no signs of abatement. Recently, courts have held that
agencies must give notice and provide an opportunity to submit data on the
threshold question of whether to prepare an impact statement, 64 must respond
on the merits to plaintiffs' contentions, 65 must reconsider regulations and
report to the court in light of new data,66 and must allow cross-examination
on complex and crucial issues of technological feasibility. 67
A noteworthy aspect of the hard look doctrine is that the response of the
agency, and later of the courts, is influenced importantly by the force and
detail of the presentations of counsel. Industriousness is rewarded, compe-
tence served. Detailed comments on the evidence must be answered; 68
technical comments and studies that are proferred addressed;69 and doubts
raised about methodology responded to.70 In general, the agency must answer
serious questions fairly raised.
In pursuing this tack, reviewing courts have not hesitated to go beyond the
limited standards of articulation and justification found in the Administrative
Procedure Act. Ordinarily, the APA itself calls only for a "concise general
60. See American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 459 (7th Cir. 1975) (agency required to justify
departure from otherwise consistent use of two sets of data).
61. See CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032, 1051 (8th Cir. 1975) (agency told to calculate new plant
costs separately from existing plant costs and to use most current and relevant data).
62. See FMC Corp. v. Train, 539 F.2d 973, 982 (4th Cir. 1976) (court required more specifics when
agency guidelines contained only vague references to elimination of'leaks and spills and thus gave
insufficient guidance in construction of new plants).
63. See International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 641 (1973) (when economic hardship
outweighed environmental benefit from enforcement of statute, court suggested EPA may fashion interim
relief short of suspension of emission standards).
64. Cross-Sound Ferry Servs., Inc. v. United States, 573 F.2d 725, 731 (2d Cir. 1978); accord, Hanly v.
Kleindienst (II), 471 F.2d 823, 830-31 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
65. See In re Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 452 F. Supp. 327, 343 (D.D.C. 1978) (agency must
respond to petitioner's challenge to agency's design criteria).
66. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 578 F.2d 337, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (in light of
rapidly developing data on inorganic contaminants, EPA must report to court on new data bearing on safe
drinking water regulations).
67. See Bunker Hill Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1286, 1305 (9th Cir. 1977) (industry must be allowed to cross-
examine EPA experts on crucial issue of technical feasibility of sulfur controls).
68. See, e.g., id. at 1299 (EPA must respond with detailed expert testimony of its own when industry
presents expert testimony rebutting agency's initial determination of technical feasibility); Portland
Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393-94 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (agency must respond to industry's
claim of inaccurate data due to faulty sampling techniques), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
69. See, e.g., Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427, 436-37 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (industry test
results show sufficiency of agency's standard), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 969 (1974); Portland Cement Ass'n v.
Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 392-94 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (agency must respond to detailed technical and
mathematical comments challenging its methodology), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
70. See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393-94 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (detailed
comments on methodology that meet threshold materiality requirement must be answered by agency), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 642 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (EPA must demonstrate reliability of methodology used to overcome manufacturers' showing of lack
of available technology).
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statement" of the "basis and purpose" of agency rules.71 The courts have
demanded more than these "minimum requirements." This course is perhaps
best illustrated by Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 72 in which the court went beyond the APA minima to remand for an
additional explanation of how the agency derived its secondary ambient air
standard for sulfur oxides.73 Similar explanations are now a routine feature of
EPA decisionmaking, 74 not likely to be discarded in the wake of Vermont
Yankee.
The National Environmental Policy Act, properly viewed, is a comprehen-
sive statutory elaboration elevating the hard look to a penetrating autopsy in
NEPA cases. The heart of the matter, of course, is the impact statement
process of section 102(2)(C), which combines "the legislative objectives of full
disclosure, consultation, and reasoned decisionmaking prescribed as the
cutting edge of administrative reform." 75 The environmental impact state-
ment provision can be viewed as an elaborate and specialized findings
requirement that far outdistances the minimal explanation of a rule's "basis
and purpose" under the APA.76
In the demanding world of the hard look, Vermont Yankee's cursory
glance seems strikingly out of step. Upon analysis, it is safe to predict that the
decision will be sharply contained.7 7 Vermont Yankee may well follow the
Supreme Court's initial utterances on NEPA in Aberdeen and Rockfish
Railroad v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures,78 which for
various reasons has had about as much practical impact as the unreported
decisions of the Superior Court of Okanogon County, State of Washington.7 9
The limited prospects for Vermont Yankee stem not so much from the
foolishness of the ruling or the rambunctiousness of the lower federal courts
but rather from the realities of current environmental law practice. Notably,
recent statutes on many subjects have explicitly adopted hard look assump-
tions,8o which have gone beyond the point of repudiation. And even the
utterances of the highest court must find a way of making peace with how the
world works, particularly when that reality is fueled by a deeply felt
conviction by litigants, lower courts, and Congress that administrative
procedures could do better.
71. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976).
72. 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
73. Id. at 850; see Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428, 450-51 (1967) (agency must explore further public
interest in private development of hydroelectric plant).
74. See Gaines, Decisionmaking Procedures at the Environmental Protection Agency, 62 IOWA L. REV.
839, 899 (1977) (courts require EPA to show that it has included all pertinent information).
75. Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (quoting W. RODGERS, supra note I, § 7.4,
at 725).
76. On the importance of a detailed statement of reasons, see Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing", 123 U.
PA. L. REV. 1267, 1292 (1972).
77. The erosion of Vermont Yankee may already be underway. In Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. EPA,
578 F.2d 660 (6th Cir. 1978), the court cited Vermont Yankee but simultaneously applied hard look
principles to disapprove the agency's modeling assumptions. Id. at 663.
78. 422 U.S. 289 (1975).
79. One of these is a turgid statement of facts that resists advances by all but the most determined.
80. See notes 127-38 infra and accompanying text.
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FOUR IMPLICATIONS OF Vermont Yankee
I. SUBSTANTIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER NEPA
Almost in passing, Mr. Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in
Vermont Yankee observes that "NEPA does set forth significant substantive
goals for the nation, but its mandate to the agencies is essentially procedur-
al." 81 To be sure, NEPA's substantive aims do have a momentous ring-as-
suring safe and healthy surroundings, preserving natural aspects of our
national heritage, and approaching the maximum attainable recycling of
depletable resources. All of these substantive goals-and others-are quite
clearly expressed in section 101(b) of NEPA.
82
The Court, quite properly, found no occasion for considering the next
question, which is not whether these goals are significant, but whether the
courts have any way of enforcing them, particularly when reviewing agency
actions. This is another issue, and a closer one. Eight courts of appeals that
have considered it, however, have reached the conclusion that NEPA grants a
limited authority to the judiciary to modify or nullify agency action found
offensive to the substantive goals of the Act.83 This conclusion is consistent
81. 435 U.S. at 558.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1976). The section reads:
In order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter, it is the continuing responsibility
of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, consistent with other essential
considerations of national policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions,
programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may-
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for
succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally
pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation, risk
to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage, and
maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity and variety of
individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit high
standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum attainable
recycling of depletable resources.
83. See Jackson County v. Jones, 571 F.2d 1004, 1013 (8th Cir. 1978) (courts have obligation under
NEPA to review agency decisions on the merits) (quoting Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of
Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 298-300 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973)); County of Suffolk v.
Secretary of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1384 (2d Cir. 1977) (dictum) (NEPA requires cost-benefit analysis)
(quoting Chelsea Neighborhood Ass'ns v. United States Postal Serv., 516 F.2d 378, 386 (2d Cir. 1975)),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs (Tennessee-
Tombigbee), 492 F.2d 1123, 1139-40 (5th Cir. 1974) (dictum) (NEPA permits limited substantive review of
agency decision); Sierra Club v. Froehlke (Kickapoo River), 486 F.2d 946, 953 (7th Cir. 1973) (agency's
decision subject to limited substantive review under NEPA); Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 1284 (1st Cir.
1973) (detailed statement in EIS allows court to determine whether agency has made a good faith effort to
consider the values NEPA is intended to vindicate); Conservation Council of North Carolina v. Froehlke
(I), 473 F.2d 664, 665 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (court should conduct limited review to determine
whether agency reached its decision after good faith consideration of substantive goals of NEPA); Calvert
Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (dictum) (under NEPA
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with the practice of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission itself which, after
several years' experience in implementing Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Com-
mittee, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commission,84 undertakes a NEPA-inspired
cost-benefit analysis in its individual licensing decisions. 85 It is also consistent
with the standards of review in the APA, which are quite clearly substantive
in that they permit the courts to strike down ,mnsupported and arbitrary and
capricious actions.86 The courts would have litite difficulty in disapproving on
the merits, let us say, the issuance of a license to transport radioactive
materials to the Red Brigade, or the adoption of a rule endorsing the use of
lower Manhattan as a spent fuel disposal area.
The case for a limited substantive review under NEPA has been fully
argued elsewhere. 87 Suffice it to say that the broad pronouncements of section
101, despite a notable lack of precision, do not appear to be so bereft of
meaning as to represent a legislative commitment of the matters to the
unreviewable discretion of the agencies. 88
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's ultimate answer to the question of
NEPA substantive review is likely to be wholly inconsequential. Substantive
NEPA is a fighting issue, but not one that decides many cases. 89 One reason is
that even though NEPA is "essentially procedural," 90 the procedural deci-
sions have had a way of working substantive modifications of agency
actions.9' More important is that NEPA litigation with substantive aims
rarely proceeds without the supporting presence of complementary federal
court may review agency decision on merits if balance of costs and benefits was arbitrary or environmental
values in NEPA § 101 were given insufficient weight); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. TVA, 371 F.
Supp. 1004, 1014 (E.D. Tenn. 1973) (NEPA permits courts to scrutinize agency's balance of costs and
benefits), affd per curiam, 492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974). But see Lathan v. Brinegar (II), 506 F.2d 677, 692-
93 (9th Cir. 1974) (acknowledging substantive review only under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), because
NEPA is essentially procedural).
84. 449 F.2d 1109, 1113-14 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (AEC required to provide detailed statement to ensure that
the balancing of costs and benefits mandated by NEPA has been undertaken).
85. See 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.20(b), 51.52(c) (1978); Trubek, Allocating the Burden of Environmental
Uncertainty: The NRC Interprets NEPA's Substantive Mandate, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 747, 755-56 (discussing
NRC rules governing license applications).
86. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976); see Lathan v. Brinegar (II), 506 F.2d 677, 692-93 (9th Cir. 1974)
(section 706(2)(A) may permit substantive review of agency environmental action). There are differences,
of course, between substantive judicial review under the arbitrary and capricious standard of 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(A) (1976) and under the excess of statutory right standard of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (1976). See note
44 supra.
87. E.g., W. RODGERS, supra note 1, § 7.5; Anderson, The National Environmental Policy Act, in
FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 238, 304-11 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974); Cohen & Warren,
Judicial Recognition of the Substantive Requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 13
B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 685 (1972), Robie, Recognition of Substantive Rights Under NEPA, 7 NAT.
RESOURCES L. 386, 423-36 (1974); Yarrington, Judicial Review of Substantive Agency Decisions: A Second
Generation of Cases Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 19 S.D. L. REV. 279, 285-94 (1974);
Note, The Least Adverse Approach to Substantive Review Under NEPA, 88 HARV. L. REV. 735, 756-58
(1975).
88. Cf. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (action is committed to
agency discretion under 5 U.S.C. § 701 only when there is no law to apply).
89. This is stated with conviction, as I have been attempting to find one for inclusion in my casebook, W.
RODGERS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENERGY & NATURAL RESOURCES LAW (1979).
90. 435 U.S. at 558.
91. See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS: AN
ANALYSIS OF SIX YEARS' EXPERIENCE BY SEVENTY FEDERAL AGENCIES 21-25, D-I to D-4 (1976).
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legislation supplying an unmistakable substantive component. The Tellico
Dam ran into trouble not because of NEPA but because of section 7 of the
Endangered Species Act.92 The oil and gas lease sale in the George's Bank
area was frustrated not so much by NEPA but by the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act.93 The injunction in the tuna fishing case rested not upon NEPA
but upon the Marine Mammal Protection Act.
94
Substantive judicial review of agency decisions on environmental and
technical issues is widespread, even without NEPA. The courts regularly
draw lines defining the agencies' authority. The result is a brisk decision on
the merits. The disappointed can seek relief in the Congress. This is what
happened in the Alaska pipeline litigation,95 and in the anticlearcutting
decisions under the National Forest Organic Act of 1897.96 Within the last
year, a partial listing of substantive decisions on environmental issues by
federal appellate courts includes holdings that section 111 of the Clean Air
Act forbids the exemption of modified facilities from the new source
performance rules,97 that motor oil is not "fuel" within the meaning of section
211 of the Clean Air Act,98 that standards under section 17 of the Noise
Control Act must be issued for all "equipment and facilities" of the
railroads, 99 that work practice standards are not "emission standards" under
92. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 191-95 (1978) (applying 16 U.S.C. § 1536) (halting construction of
dam that threatened endangered species). See also W. RODGERS, supra note 1, § 7.12, at 828-29 (discussing
Endangered Species Act as complementary to NEPA).
93. See Massachusetts v. Andrus, I 1 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1138, 1141-42 (D. Mass.), stay denied, 8 Envir. L.
Rep. 20,192 (1st Cir. 1978) (Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act requires Interior secretary to preserve
character of sea, navigation and fishing over continental shelf).
94. See Committee for Humane Legislation, Inc. v. Richardson, 414 F. Supp. 297, 313-14 (D.D.C.)
(applying 16 U.S.C. § 1361) (incidental killing of porpoises enjoined until Secretary determined that
killings were consistent with purposes of Marine Mammal Protection Act), injunction stayed, 540 F.2d
1141 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
95. See Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 891-93 (D.C. Cir.) (applying Mineral Leasing Act of
1920, § 28, 41 Stat. 449) (enjoining Interior Secretary from issuing special land use permit granting rights
of way for pipeline construction), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973). The court's decision was overruled
legislatively by 1973 amendments to the Mineral Leasing Act. See 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1976) (giving Secretary
discretion to grant right of way).
96. See West Virginia Div. of the Izaak Walton League v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945, 948 (4th Cir. 1975)
(applying Organic Act of 1897, 16 U.S.C. § 476 (1970)) (enjoining Forest Service from allowing
clearcutting of national forests because plain language of statute permitted cutting only of individually
marked dead or mature trees); Zieske v. Butz, 406 F. Supp. 258, 259-60 (D. Alaska 1975) (same), afrd on
rehearing, 412 F. Supp. 1403, 1405-06 (D. Alaska 1976); cf Miller v. Mallery, 410 F. Supp. 1283, 1296 &
n.ll. (D. Ore. 1976) (applying Bull Run Trespass Act, 33 Stat. 526) (enjoining Forest Service logging
program on terms of statute but practically inviting appellate reversal or congressional repeal). The 1897
Act was repealed by the National Forest Management Act of 1976, § 13, Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2958
(1976), and the Trespass Act was repealed by the Act of November 23, 1977, § 3(c), Pub. L. No. 95-200, 91
Stat. 1428 (1977).
97. See ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319, 329 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Clean Air Act Amendments of
1970, § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6 (1976)). EPA regulations had permited an increase in pollution from one
building within a large complex, as long as the pollution from the total complex did not increase, but the
court held the agency's "bubble concept" contrary to the words and intent of the statute. Id. at 326-29.
98. See Lubrizol Corp. v. EPA, 562 F.2d 807, 818-19 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Clean Air Act Amendments of
1970, § 211, 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6c(1976)).
99. See Association of Am. R.Rs. v. Costle, 562 F.2d 1310, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Noise Control Act of
1972, § 17, 42 U.S.C. § 4916 (1976)).
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section 112 of the Clean Air Act, 10o and that agency action having socioeco-
nomic consequences alone does not produce a significant impact on the
"quality of the human environment" under NEPA. toI
Predicting the likelihood of substantive judicial review under environmen-
tal statutes is mostly a matter of assessing the prospects of an administrative
trespass into territory withdrawn by legislation. Obviously, these legislative
mandates range from the hopelessly vague to the relentlessly specific, and
include everything in between. The tighter the legislation, the finer the margin
for administrative error, and the happier the prospects for judicial correction
of mistakes; the broader the delegation, the more difficult it is to convince a
court that the legislature did not mean to have one accept his administrative
fate. 10 2
On this spectrum, NEPA is a statute imprecise in its mandates. Rarely can
the administrator be charged credibly with pursuing a result the statute
forbids. In this circumstance, or any other in which the administrator stays
within the channels of the assigned authority, what remains of the hard look
is the assurance of fair procedures and reasoned results. It is these features of
the hard look doctrine that are put in jeopardy by Vermont Yankee.
II. JUDICIAL IMPOSITION OF PROCEDURES BEYOND THE STATUTORY
MINIMA OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
The Vermont Yankee decision is quite clear in its determination that in the
absence of extremely compelling circumstances courts should refrain from
100. See Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 289 (1978) (Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1970, § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1976)).
101. See Image of Greater San Antonio v. Brown, 570 F.2d 517, 522 (5th Cir. 1978) (National
Environmental Protection Act of 1969, § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976)).
102. A few environmental statutes illustrate tightly drawn legislation that leads to close review of agency
action. E.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976) (assuring habitat preservation
for every species brought within its protection); Colorado River Storage Project Act of 1956, 43 U.S.C. §
620 (1976) (making clear that water from Lake Powell impoundment should not enter the Rainbow Bridge
National Monument) (held to have been repealed in relevant part in Friends of the Earth v. Armstrong,
485 F.2d 1, 6-7 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1171 (1974)); Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, § 28, 41
Stat. 449 (delineating precise right-of-way width limitations for pipelines) (amended by Trans-Alaska
Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973, 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1976)); National Forest Organic Act of 1897, ch. 2, §
1, 30 Stat. 35 (permitting the sale of "dead, matured or large growth of trees," so long as the trees to be sold
were "marked and designated," and removed "under the supervision of a person appointed by the
Secretary of Agriculture") (repealed 1976); accord, Association for Protection of the Adirondacks v.
MacDonald, 253 N.Y. 234, 242, 170 N.E. 902, 905 (1930) (applying "forever wild" provision of New York
Constitution to void law authorizing construction of bobsleigh run that would have necessitated cutting
trees on state land); Helms v. Reid, 90 Misc. 2d 583, 607-09, 394 N.Y. Supp. 2d 987, 1004-05 (Sup. Ct.
1977) (applying "forever wild" provision to uphold regulation precluding landing of seaplanes on lakes
surrounded by Adirondack Park); cf. Fitzgerald v. Baxter State Park Auth., 385 A.2d 189, 198-99 (Me.
1978) (forest cleanup program held to violate "natural wild state" and "sanctuary for wild beasts and
birds" language in deed of trust conveying parkland to state).
By contrast, agencies are allowed wide discretion under vague statutes. See, e.g., Multiple-Use and
Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. § 531 (a) (1976) (provisions lacking enforceable standards); Federal
Power Act of 1920, § 10(a), 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1976) (inviting Federal Power Commission to license
hydroelectric projects "best adapted" to a comprehensive plan); Atomic Energy Act of 1946, § 182, 42
U.S.C. § 2232 (1976) (inviting administrative decisionmaker to require information he may "deem
necessary" to protect the "health and safety of the public").
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directing the agencies to employ procedures beyond the minima of the
APA.103 In notice and comment rulemaking, these minima include statutory
rights to be advised of the substance of the proposal, to comment upon it in
writing, and to receive a "concise general statement" of the "basis and
purpose" of the rule adopted10 4 This aspect of Vermont Yankee is likely to
raise the ire of the practicing bar. The concern is that procedural rights, and
the opportunities to probe agency decisionmaking, will be frozen in the 1946
APA model.105 In particular, the limited rights of cross-examination recog-
nized by International Harvester might evaporate 06 along with the require-
ments that administrators closely justify their decisions. 10 7 These are both
crucial procedural components of the hard look doctrine. 08
The serious implications of Vermont Yankee for hard look procedures,
nonetheless, are unlikely to materialize. In the first place, the Court probably
killed a straw man of its own creation. Judge Bazelon's opinion for the court
below specifically refrains from ordering the NRC to adopt a fixed agenda of
procedures, and outlines the possibilities only by way of suggestion. 09 The
opinion, however, is pregnant with the notion that the Commission's choice
of procedures was inadequate to develop a record that would support the
spent fuel cycle rule." 0 Judge Bazelon also has made clear in other contexts
that judicial review of technical agency decisions ought to concentrate on
procedures, not the merits,"' although he is not accused of committing
reversible error in a law review article. The apparent mistake of the majority
opinion of the court of appeals was in being a trifle too specific in suggesting
how the remand might be handled." 2 The Supreme Court directs courts not
to tell agencies how to conduct their rulemakings, which is rarely done by
letter and verse anyhow. Even the renowned right of cross-examination
recognized by International Harvester was advanced by the court only as a
possibility in particular cases of need," 3 and was not used upon remand. 14
103. 435 U.S. at 543.
104. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976).
105. See Stewart, supra note 1, at 1811-20.
106. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (dictum) (agency
may be required to permit cross-examination on critical points where normal agency procedures would be
inadequate).
107. See notes 48-70 supra and accompanying text.
108. See notes 45-50 supra and accompanying text.
109. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 653-54 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
110. See id. at 643-46 (court must decide whether procedures adequate to ventilate the issue and
whether adequate diversity of opinion was heard and considered); id. at 653 (court suggests but does not
require procedures such as informal conferences, discovery, interrogatories, limited cross-examination, and
funding of outside intervenors as a means for agency to develop a complete record).
111. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J.,
concurring); Bazelon, Coping with Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 817, 822-
23 (1977); Bazelon, The Impact of the Courts on Public Administration, 52 IND. L.J. 101, 107 (1976).
112. See 435 U.S. at 541-42 ("The [circuit] court .. . refrained from actually ordering the agency to
follow any specific procedures. . . but there is little doubt in our minds that the ineluctable mandate of the
court's decision is that the procedures afforded during the hearings were inadequate.").
113. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
114. Williams, supra note 46, at 443. A principal bone of contention between Professors Stewart and
Byse appears to be the proper specificity of remand orders, a subject hardly worth scrapping over. Compare
Stewart, supra note 1, at 1819 with Byse, supra note 1, at 1826-29. Ordinarily, the courts ought to refrain
from instructing the agency on how to go about developing its record. It is but a small step for the court.
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Thus, Vermont Yankee effectively forbids a narrow form of appellate directive
that is almost never used, perhaps not even in the case under review.
Next, although the Court prohibits a reversal for procedural inadequacy,
the justices approve a remand to determine "whether the challenged rule finds
sufficient justification in the administrative proceedings that it should be
upheld by the reviewing court."1 5 Judge Tamm, concurring below, thought it
did not, 116 and obviously neither did the majority. 117 Thus, the rule went back
to the Commission as insufficiently supported under the arbitrary and
capricious standard and not because the Commission used faulty procedures.
Next time, the rule could fail again as inadequately supported if the
Commission were to bring back a record consisting chiefly of a twenty-page
expression of confidence in the future, untested by cross-examination and
unresponsive to serious concerns.118
Unfortunately, the potential mischief of Vermont Yankee will not be stilled
by recognition that it forbids only a peculiar form of offensive overbearing in
remand orders. Vermont Yankee very well may be read as discouraging
remands to correct record weaknesses that are best improved by resort to
specific procedural techniques, such as disclosure or cross-examination. The
decision thus is likely to take the impetus out of the agencies' innovative use of
procedures beyond the statutory minima.1 9 It also may preclude the discov-
however, to suggest a resort to hybrid procedures thought likely to produce an adequate record on remand.
The argument of judicial overreaching, articulated in Vermont Yankee, ignores the largely constructive
role courts have played in the development and acceptance of hybrid procedures by the agencies. See
Stewart, supra, at 1819 & n.60, 1820.
115. 435 U.S. at 549. But see Friendly, supra note 76, at 1314 (practical result nearly the same whether
rule invalidated because not based on substantial evidence or because additional procedures required).
116. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 658-59 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Tamm,
J., concurring).
117. See id. at 647-52.
118. The rule reviewed in Vermont Yankee was flimsily supported, resting on little more than Dr.
Pittman's confident assertions that the disposal problem could be worked out in time. Id. An NRC
observer has noted that the interim rule promulgated by the agency after remand "resembled the
overturned one very closely," and that the Commission's resources "would have been better spent in other
endeavors, such as the ultimate solution to the waste management problem." Muntzing, The Courts and
Energy Policy, at 16 (remarks before a conference sponsored by the National Legal Center for the Public
Interest, 1977) (copy on file at the Georgetown Law Journal). The conflict between compliance with the
court of appeals' remand order and pursuit of the ultimate solution to the waste management problem is
not readily apparent. One may never know whether short term diversions in the form of environmental
assessments may yet point the way toward a mobilization of resources that yields long term solutions. On
the elusiveness of the ultimate solution, see U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, REPORT OF TASK FORCE FOR
REVIEw OF NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT (1978) (DOE/ER-0004/D); Carter, Nuclear Wastes: The
Science of Geologic Disposal Seen as Weak, 200 Sci. 1135 (1978); Carter, "Cooperative Federalism"
Proposed for Siting Waste Repositories, 202 SC!. 501 (1978); La Porte, Nuclear Waste: Increasing Scale and
Socio-political Impacts, 201 ScI. 22 (1978).
119. See generally Ames & McCracken, Framing Regulatory Standards to Avoid Formal Adjudication:
The FDA As a Case Study, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 14 (1976); Auerbach, Informal Rule Making: A Proposed
Relationship Between Administrative Procedures and Judicial Review, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 15 (1977); Boyer,
Alternatives to Administrative Trial-Type Hearings for Resolving Complex Scientific, Economic and Social
Issues, 71 MICH. L. REV. 111 (1972); Cramton, A Comment on Trial-Type Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant
Siting, 58 VA. L. REV. 585 (1972); Currie & Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action:
Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1975); Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of
Rules of General Applicability: The Need for Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60
CALIF. L. REV. 1276 (1972); Koch, Discovery in Rulemaking, 1977 DUKE L.J. 295; McGarity, Substantive
and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens
19791 A HARD LOOK AT Vermont Yankee
ery in NEPA of a number of procedural commands not found in the APA.120
And it is likely to encourage relaxation of the elaborate and healthy demands
upon the agencies to explain and justify their judgments in detail. 121 The
agencies will invoke Vermont Yankee in defense of crabbed rationalizations of
adopted rules. Not improbable is a spate of litigation over whether judicially
ordered explanations or procedural exercises arguably beyond the APA
minima are supportable nonetheless under expansive interpretations of the
"arbitrary [and] capricious" standard or the "basis and purpose" require-
ment, 22 an independent statute such as 28 U.S.C. § 2106,123 or NEPA,124 or
even the dictates of procedural due process. 125 At worst, Vermont Yankee
in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEo. L.J. 729 (1979); Robinson, The Making ofAdministrative Policy: Another Look
at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1970);
Whitney, Technical and Scientific Evidence in Administrative Adjudication, 45 U. CIN. L. REV. 37 (1976);
Note, The Judicial Role in Defining Procedural Requirements for Agency Rulemaking, 87 HARV. L. REV.
782 (1974).
120. The Supreme Court stated that "it is clear NEPA cannot serve as the basis for a substantial revision
of the carefully constructed procedural specifications of the APA." 435 U.S. at 548. Others have found it
not nearly so clear. See, e.g., W. RODGERS, supra note 1, § 7.3, at 717-25 (and cases cited therein);
Anderson, supra note 87, at 314-20. Some courts hold that NEPA requires a cost-benefit analysis of agency
action. E.g., County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1384 (2d Cir.) (NEPA requires cost-
benefit analysis of major federal activities balancing costs and environmental effects), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1064 (1977); Chelsea Neighborhood Ass'ns v. United States Postal Serv., 516 F.2d 378, 386-87 (2d Cir.
1975) (same). This requirement of a cost-benefit analysis seems clearly to be a procedural requirement in
NEPA, much like a detailed findings requirement, going well beyond the APA minima.
121. See notes 48-70 supra and accompanying text.
122. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c)(1976). For cases in which the courts have acknowledged the applicability of the
APA but nevertheless seem to require more than the APA minimum, see Appalachian Power Co. v. Train,
566 F.2d 451, 456-57 (4th Cir. 1977) (EPA thermal regulations invalidated because reasonable availability
of unpublished regulation did not meet APA requirements for actual notice or publication), Fund for
Animals v. Frizzell, 530 F.2d 982, 988-90 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (in addition to explicit APA
requirements, agency must give advance notice of possible changes in open season on certain migratory
birds).For an example of on-the-record requirements in adjudication, see Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v.
Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 879 (1st Cir. 1978) (in adjudication under APA decision could be based only on
documents presented at or before public hearing).
123. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 578 F.2d 337, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (citing statute
and requiring EPA to report on changes in drinking water standard based on new data). The statute states:
The Supreme Court, or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm, modify,
vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree or order of a court lawfully brought before it
for review, and may remand the cause and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment,
decree or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the
circumstances.
28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1976).
124. See note 120 supra.
125. See Taylor v. District Eng'r, Army Corps of Eng'rs, 567 F.2d 1332, 1338-41 (5th Cir. 1978) (Corps'
refusal to comply with its own regulations and agreements violated permittee's due process rights); Shell
Oil Co. v. FPC, 520 F.2d 1061, 1075-76 (5th Cir.) (agency did not violate procedural due process when it
afforded private parties an opportunity to make their case and to challenge Commission's evidence), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1975). See generally Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for
Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U.
CHi. L. REV. 28, 28 n.1 (1976) (collecting authorities); Rabin, Job Security and Due Process: Monitoring
Administrative Discretion Through a Reasons Requirement, 44 U. CH. L. REV. 60 (1976); Comment,
Entitlement, Enjoyment, and Due Process of Law, 1974 DUKE L.J. 89.
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could soften the hard look and blunt the urgency of the new age of
administrative responsibility. 126
The principal reason dire readings of Vermont Yankee are unlikely to be
realized is that Congress, in recent statutes addressing technological pol-
icymaking, routinely has imposed procedures beyond the APA minima, and
embraced a variety of procedural commands associated with the hard look
doctrine. This trend preceded Vermont Yankee, and was influenced by a
number of judicial decisions now of doubtful force because of Vermont
Yankee. The legislation strongly approves, and strengthens, a variety of
judicially initiated hard look innovations now commended to agencies by the
Administrative Conference. 27 This demonstration of creative partnership
between the courts and Congress in overseeing the administrative function
might not have occurred had the Supreme Court insisted earlier on the
preservation of a 1946 vintage of administrative regularity.
To mention only the prominent examples, the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1977 contain detailed provisions on the preparation of a record to enhance
judicial review in notice and comment rulemaking. 28 This must be seen as a
move to require "that an agency be judged on a single, comprehensive,
detailed justification for its decision, prepared at the time when it promulgates
a rule."' 129 The Clean Water Act of 1977, in the section addressing promulga-
tion of effluent standards for toxic pollutants, has elaborate public hearing
provisions with limited rights of cross-examination similar to those suggested
in International Harvester.130 The Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976131
contains a number of procedural refinements on notice and comment
rulemaking, including provisions for a detailed statement of basis and
purpose, specifics on the conduct of hearings, a limited right of cross-
examination, and the keeping of verbatim transcripts that become part of the
126. The Supreme Court's classic contribution to the hard look doctrine, Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), fora variety of reasons has been treated harshly by commentators.
E.g., Nathanson, Probing the Mind of the Administrator: Hearing Variations and Standards of Judicial
Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act and Other Federal Statutes, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 721, 722-
24, 762-70 (1975). This is not the occasion for a full scale defense of Overton Park, other than to note that
this academic failure has enjoyed a stunning success in the real world. Between March 1971, when the case
was decided, and December 1978, Overton Park has been cited in federal court opinions on more than 650
occasions.
127. See ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1976 REPORT 44-45 (1977)
(recommending agency utilization of rulemaking procedures beyond the APA, including adjudicatory
procedures, additional opportunities for public comment, and explanations of agency tests, procedures, and
conclusions).
128. Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 305, 91 Stat. 772 (1977) (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7607) (implementing in
important particulars the recommendations of Pedersen, supra note 28, at 78-82).
129. Pedersen, supra note 28, at 73. Enthusiasm for on-the-record rulemaking when the agency acts in a
classic legislative sense under section 553 of the APA is not universal. See Auerbach, supra note 119, at 61.
Of course there will be a record prepared for purposes of judicial review, even if the agency must compile
one on an ad hoc basis. See Pedersen, supra, at 63, 66-70; Wright, Commentary: Rulemaking and Judicial
Review, 30 ADMIN. L. REV. 461, 464-65 (1978). Discovering the record, and supplementing what has been
discovered, may call for a substantial judicial undertaking. The trial following remand in Overton Park
lasted 25 days, an exercise aptly described as an example of "the 'hard look' doctrine in spades." Leventhal,
Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 514 (1974).
130. Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 53(a)(2), 91 Stat. 1589 (1977) (to be codified in 33 U.S.C. § 1317).
131. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976).
1979] A HARD LOOK AT Vermont Yankee
record on review. 132 This statute also approves a remand on grounds
condemned explicitly by Vermont Yankee. 133 Elsewhere, legislative endorse-
ment of the hard look doctrine takes the form of a tightening of the standard
of review, 134 mandatory consultation, 135 and elaborate findings require-
ments. 136 These provisions fulfill the same function of justification under the
gun as does the hard look case law. 3 7 The findings requirements, moreover,
provide the basis for a sharpened substantive judicial review. Several of these
findings provisions obviously bear the stamp of NEPA's-impact statements.
3 8
Within certain defined areas, they subject the agency to the liability of
litigation now routine under environmental impact statements.
This wholesale assault by Congress, in a word, has transformed the
agencies into suspect legislators. Rulemaking under constraint of the hybrid
procedures has become not the exception but the norm. The agencies are no
longer trusted with the free-wheeling, answerable-to-none, brainstorming
function that is at the heart of the classic legislative model of rulemaking. 139
Failures of performance, the recurrence of bias and sloth, and other agency
weaknesses have taken a toll. Protected on the flank by a dormant delegation
doctrine, administrative authority is succumbing nonetheless to a piecemeal
congressional war of attrition that adds up to a repudiation of the authority of
the agencies to legislate without a record by means of their choosing. 40 While
132. Id. § 2605(c). This section of the Act closely follows the Federal Trade Commission Act
Amendments of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 57a-57c (1976). See Kestenbaum, Rulemaking Beyond APA: Criteria for
Trial-Type Procedures and the FTC Improvement Act, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 679 (1976). Both of these
statutes have been described recently as representing new maxima in the procedural baggage of
rulemakings. Fuchs, Development and Diversification in Administrative Rule Making, 72 Nw. U.L. REV.
83, 104 (1977).
133. A remand is in order if administrative limitations upon the right of cross-examination are found to
have precluded "disclosure of disputed material facts . . . necessary to a fair determination" by the
Administrator. 15 U.S.C. § 2618(c)(1)(B)(ii) (1976); cf. id. § 57a(e)(3) (similar standard for judicial review
of FTC rulemaking proceedings).
134. See 29 U.S.C. 655(f) (1976) (Occupational Safety and Health Act) (findings of Secretary conclusive
if supported by substantial evidence in record), interpreted in Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v.
Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (substantial evidence standard requires careful identification
by Secretary of reasons for his decision whether supported by facts in record or judgment and policy).
135. See 49 U.S.C. § 1712(f) (1970) (Airport and Airway Development Act) (requires airport planners
to consult with HEW, Department of Agriculture, and Council on Environmental Quality concerning
environmental effects of airport plans).
136. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b) (1976) (requires economic impact analysis of proposed changes in
classifications of certain pesticides); 16 U.S.C. § 1455(e) (1976) (lists findings required before approval of a
state coastal zone management program); 30 U.S.C. § 201 (a)(3)(c) (1976) (requires evaluation of effects
prior to issuance of a federal coal lease); 42 U.S.C. § 5904(a)(5) (1976) (requires net energy analysis of
proposals for funding under Federal Non-Nuclear Energy Research and Development Act of 1974); 42
U.S.C. § 6295(a)(4)(C), (D) (1976) (requires cost-benefit analysis in connection with establishment of an
energy efficiency standard); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-87, § 522(d), 91
Stat. 445 (1977) (to be codified in 30 U.S.C. § 1272) (requires economic, environmental, and coal supply
analysis before any land is designated unsuitable for surface coal mining).
137. See notes 48-70 supra and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136w(d) (1976).
139. See Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441, 451-52 (1937) (state legislature not required to make
inquiries before taking action); National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 693 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (agency may make rules within its statutory authority), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
140. A generic legislative overhauling of the APA was proposed by Senator Ribicoff and others in the
95th Congress. S. 2490, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. S1196-1207 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1978). Bx
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purists will grumble about this erosion of executive authority, pragmatists
will recognize the loss as a reasonable price to pay for an injection of
discipline into agency decisionmaking.
In its literal insistence upon the APA "minima," Vermont Yankee is a day
late and a dollar short. The ruling was a relic the day it was handed down.
III. BALLS AND STRIKES: THE AGENCIES' OBLIGATION TO CONSIDER
ALTERNATIVES WITHOUT REGARD TO THE INITIATIVE OF THE PARTIES
A third aspect of Vermont Yankee of special concern to public interest
intervenors is its impact upon what I will call the balls and strikes doctrine.
This concept traces its contemporary birth to the famous opinion of Judge
Paul Hays and the less well known observations of Federal Power Commis-
sioner Charles Ross, 14 in Scenic Hudson (I). 142 In holding that the Commis-
sion failed to consider alternatives and measures to minimize effects from a
pumped storage project planned for the Hudson River, Judge Hays wrote:
[T]he Commission has claimed to be the representative of the
public interest. This role does not permit it to act as an umpire
blandly calling balls and strikes for adversaries appearing before it;
the right of the public must receive active and affirmative protec-
tion at the hands of the Commission. 143
The umpire metaphor was picked up and repeated by Judge Skelly Wright in
his powerful Calvert Cliffs' opinion,1" which took the Atomic Energy
Commission to task for omitting from hearings environmental issues not
raised by the parties. 145
approving modified procedures for on-the-record hearings, the bill eschewed the trend toward the
formalization of informal rulemakings while endorsing the concept of hybrid procedures. Section-by-
section analysis of S. 2490, 124 CONG. REC. S1202 (quoting American Public Gas Ass'n v. FPC (The
Second Nat'l Natural Gas Rate Cases), 567 F.2d 1016, 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). Representatives of the
organized bar, predictably, are less than enthusiastic about the limited right to trial-type procedures
contained in the bill. Report of the Comm. on Revision of the Administrative Procedure Act to the Council
of the [American Bar Association] Section on Administrative Law on S.2490, passim (Sept. 8, 1978)
(unpublished report on file at the Georgetown Law Journal). Administration proposals to modify nuclear
licensing proceedings by curtailing adjudicatory procedures have been opposed on similar grounds by
segments of the organized bar. See H.R. 11704, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 123 CONG. REc. H2298 (daily ed.
Mar. 21, 1978); S.2775, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S4259 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1978); Report and
Resolution of the Environmental Quality Control Committee, Section on Administrative Law, American
Bar Association, passim (1978).
141. Consolidated Edison Co., Project No. 2338, 33 F.P.C. 428,458,463 (1965) (Ross, C., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (agency on its own motion must make sure that a full record is presented and
that all alternatives are considered).
142. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC (I), 354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1965) (order set
aside because FPC failed to compile sufficient record to support its decision and failed to make thorough
study of alternatives), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
143. Id. at 620.
144. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
145. Id. at 1119. The court stated:
The primary responsibility for fulfilling [NEPA's] mandate lies with the Commission. Its
responsibility is not simply to sit back, like an umpire, and resolve adversary contentions at
the hearing stage. Rather, it must make itself take the initiative of considering environmental
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Repudiation of the agency-as-umpire model has important implications on
at least three levels. One is that each agency must accept environmental
protection as part of its organic mandate. This is a basic teaching of NEPA,146
and is largely unaffected by Vermont Yankee. 147 Whether this environmental
mandate gives way before other concerns is a statutory matter with NEPA
succumbing only in the event of a clear conflict. 148
Two other important implications of the Scenic Hudson-Calvert Cliffs'
balls-and-strikes doctrine are put in jeopardy by Vermont Yankee. One is the
notion that the environmental umbrella somehow exempts the parties from
the normal obligations of the adversary process; these matters must receive
active and affirmative protection by the agency regardless of the posture of
the parties. The second, closely related to the first, is that environmental
issues, not unlike civil liberties, 149 have a preferred status150 deserving a
"special claim" to judicial protection.' 5' Consistently with this status, a
sizeable number of cases, often with explicit reliance upon Scenic Hudson or
Calvert Cliffs', have excused environmental advocates from certain universal
hazards such as laches, 52 waiver,153 exhaustion of administrative.remedies,154
specifications of objections with precision,155 and proof of the usual indicia of
equitable relief. 56
The broadest implications of the balls-and-strikes doctrine are revolution-
ary. Once the agency abandons its role as umpire, it takes on all the functions
values at every distinctive and comprehensive stage of the process beyond the staff's
evaluation and recommendation.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing, among other cases, Scenic Hudson).
146. See W. RODGERS, supra note 1, § 7.1, at 699-701.
147. 435 U.S. at 553 ("NEPA places upon an agency the obligation to consider every significant aspect
of the environmental impact of a proposed action.").
148. Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776, 788 (1976).
149. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
150. Compare Sagoff, On Preserving the Natural Environmert, 84 YALE L.J. 205, 265-67 (1974)
(environmental policy should be based on Constitution because it is aimed at preserving symbols of
American culture) with Tribe, From Environmental Foundations to Constitutional Structures: Learning
From Nature's Future, 84 YALE L.J. 545 (1974) (criticizing Sagoff's proposed substantive protection for
environmental policy and advocating instead emphasis on procedures).
151. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(fundamental interests in life, health, and liberty have special claim to judicial protection).
152. See, e.g., Ecology Center of Louisiana, Inc. v. Coleman, 515 F.2d 860, 868-69 (5th Cir. 1975)
(laches does not apply because defendants did not show high level of prejudice required when environment
is involved); Lathan v. Brinegar (II), 506 F.2d 677, 692 (9th Cir. 1974) (laches not applied because issue
important to public and plaintiff did not show "extreme lack of diligence" in raising issue); Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164, 1182 (6th Cir. 1972) (delay not unreasonable because citizens
were entitled to assume that TVA would comply with NEPA). But see note 185 infra and accompanying
text.
153. See United States v. 18.2 Acres of Land, 442 F. Supp. 800, 803-05 (E.D. Cal. 1977) (technical
violation of rule held not to constitute waiver in light of broad mandate of NEPA).
154. Jette v. Bergland, 579 F.2d 59, 64 (10th Cir. 1978) (full exhaustion of administrative remedies not
required for plaintiff seeking to require agency to prepare EIS; agency cannot follow procedure that allows
it to avoid preparation of impact statement). But see note 186 and accompanying text.
155. Cf. 1-291 Why? Ass'n v. Burns, 517 F.2d 1077, 1081 (2d Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (general claim that
state violated NEPA and breached responsibility to public upheld because state's figures in its own EIS
found by court to be contradictory). But see note 183 infra and accompanying text.
156. See W. RODGERS, supra note 1, § 7.10, at 798-99.
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of the players.157 The staff is supposed to ferret out issues that have not
occurred to the parties. There may be room for the presentation of more than
one staff position, or perhaps separate funding of intervenors to assure
satisfactory ventilation of their points of view.158 The active and affirmative
protection of environmental interests would seem to oblige staff counsel to
disclose latent weaknesses in the agency case, produce useful documents not
requested, and identify helpful experts within the agency even if they are
hostile to the staff position. All this is entirely alien to traditional advocacy,
particularly in the adjudicatory setting. And despite an occasional excep-
tion, 59 any attorney with any experience in environmental litigation will tell
you that the agencies are not noted for excessive procedural generosity to
intervenors.
Vermont Yankee assures that procedural beneficence resulting from agen-
cies giving active and affirmative protection to the public interest in the
environment will not get out of hand. The court of appeals, invoking the
umpire metaphor, 60 concluded that when an intervenor's comments "bring
'sufficient attention to the issue to stimulate the Commission's consideration
of it,' " the Commission must "undertake its own preliminary investigation
of the proferred alternative sufficient to reach a rational judgment whether it
is worthy of detailed consideration in the EIS . . . [and] must explain the
basis for each conclusion that further consideration of a suggested alternative
is unwarranted."' 6' The court of appeals, which saw the energy conservation
alternative as having been "forcefully pointed out" by the citizens' group in its
comments on the draft environmental impact statement, 162 concluded that the
Commission's threshold test demanded more and thus placed unacceptably
"heavy substantive burdens on intervenors."'
' 63
Strongly disagreeing, the Supreme Court held that the energy conservation
alternative did not have to be addressed because the intervenors did not raise
their objections with sufficient support and precision. 164 The Court was
critical of the intervenor's procedural moves, hinting that matters were raised
in the abstract only to lay the groundwork for a subsequent judicial attack. 165
The Court repudiated the "heavy substantive burden" label, and endorsed the
Commission's threshold test requiring a sufficient showing "to require
157. The effect is to shift the burden to the agency staff to address fully all issues raised, come forward
with relevant documentation from its files, and produce witnesses. Id. § 1.5, at 21.
158. Note, Federal Agency Assistance to Impecunious Intervenors, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1815 (1975)
(discussing proposals and concluding that agencies have residual powers to sponsor presentation of
opposing views that would otherwise not be heard).
159. See 41 Fed. Reg. 50,829 (1976) (proposing financial assistance to intervenors in proceeding to
determine authorization of widespread commercial use of mixed oxide fuel, despite general policy not to
assist intervenors).
160. Aeschliman v. NRC, 547 F.2d 622, 627 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
161. Id. at 628 (quoting Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co. v. FPC, 502 F.2d 336, 339 (1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 946 (1975)).
162. Id. at 625.
163. Id. at 627 n.ll.
164. 435 U.S. at 554.
165. Id. at 553-54 ("[A]dministrative proceedings should not be a game or a forum to engage in
unjustified obstructionism by making cryptic and obscure reference to matters that 'ought to be' considered
and then, after failing to do more to bring the matter to the agency's attention, seeking to have that agency
determination vacated on the ground that the agency failed to consider matters 'forcefully presented.' ").
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reasonable minds to inquire further."1 66 Although the Court gave lip service
to the agencies' obligations under NEPA-which include the obligation to
consider alternatives167-Vermont Yankee puts the burden on intervenors to
demonstrate that an alternative is reasonably available before it must be
investigated and weighed by the agency.168 This new burden does not mean
much in the obvious cases where an alternative is plainly credible, such as a
coal-burning facility instead of a nuclear power plant, or in cases where an
alternative is plainly incredible, such as birth control in lieu of a new housing
project. It means a great deal, however, in the case of arguable or partial
alternatives, such as energy conservation, which is within a reasonable, albeit
ambitious, range of policy options. 169 These alternatives cause the greatest
difficulty within an agency. 170 They are normally-beyond the reach of-or
even alien to-the agency's primary mission. Staffing capability, experience,
predilection, and bias all conspire against in-depth investigations of these
alternatives. NEPA was intended to overcome just this type of institutional
onesidedness. 171 And the difficulties for the agency investigating marginal
alternatives are magnified many times for intervenors who usually work with
limited resources.172
Vermont Yankee's qualification of the balls-and-strikes doctrine and its
narrowing of NEPA stem not so much from the statement of the burden but
from the context in which the statement is made. The Court's adoption of the
Commission's definition of the intervenors' burden and its quotation from
Portland Cement Association1 73 can be read as merely hard look standard
166. Id. at 554 (quoting In re Consumers Power Co., 7 A.E.C. 19, 32 n.27 (1974)).
167. 42 U.S.C. § 4335(c)(iii) (1976).
168. 435 U.S. at 553 ("While it is true that NEPA places upon an agency the obligation to consider
every significant aspect of the enviromental impact of proposed action, it is still incumbent upon
intervenors who wish to participate to structure their participation so that it is meaningful, so that it alerts
the agency to the intervenors' position and contentions.").
169. See Mueller, Energy Conservation Alternatives to Nuclear Power, A Case Study, National
Aeronautics & Space Administration Doc. No. X-73-205 (July 1973) (Goddard Space Flight Center).
Consideration of the energy conservation alternative, for example, might result in a reduction of units at a
given site.
170. Another example would be that of a dam-building agency considering nonstructural alternatives
such as floodplain zoning.
171. See SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS, NATIONALENVIRONMENTALPOLICYACT
OF 1969, S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 14, 19-20 (1969) (NEPA intended to overcome institutional
constraints preventing agencies from considering enviromental concerns). See also Hill & Ortolano,
NEPA's Effect on the Consideration of Alternatives: A Crucial Test, 18 NAT. RES. J. 285, 308-11 (1978)
(concluding that NEPA has done little to overcome agency bias).
172. Agency assistance to intervenors is modest. See, e.g., Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC (IV), 559
F.2d 1227, 1238 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc) (denying fees to intervenors); 41 Fed. Reg. 50,829 (1976)
(announcing decision not to provide financial assistance to NRC intervenors generally, but proposing
assistance in one pending case).
173. 435 U.S. at 533. The Court stated:
"[C]omments must be significant enough to step over a threshold requirement of materiality
before any lack of agency response or consideration becomes of concern. The comment
cannot merely state that a particular mistake was made. . . ; it must show why the mistake
was of possible significance in the results ....
Id. (quoting Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 921 (1974)).
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fare-namely, the agency is obliged to respond only to serious concerns and
not frivolous hypotheticals. 174 Energy conservation, however, does not at first
blush appear so silly a notion that it can be written off as incapable of
reducing the need for nuclear units. 175 It is difficult, for example, to place
energy conservation on the same plane of frivolity as the unsupported claim of
sampling error posited in Portland Cement.176 Vermont Yankee does not flatly
deny this, as the decision rests equally upon the apparent unreasonableness of
the alternative at the time it was advanced and the failure of the intervenors to
demonstrate otherwise. 177 Vermont Yankee, unfortunately, does support an
argument that in a sizable category of "colorable,"' 178 partial, or arguable
alternatives, the agency can sit back like an umpire, blind and fat, refusing to
look into the matter itself and faulting the litigants before it for not curing this
homegrown myopia. Vermont Yankee thus advises the courts to defer to the
agencies on the content of the EIS and on the selection of procedural hurdles
that must be cleared by those who would expand this content.
179
In its insistence that parties litigating environmental issues not be given the
benefit of a procedural doubt, Vermont Yankee also discourages the view that
environmental matters are so fundamental as to be entitled to a special claim
to judicial protection. 180 The lower federal courts had been of two minds on
the matter, with one line of authority embracing the idea, 181 another rejecting
it.182 Even before Vermont Yankee, courts increasingly balked at the notion
that they ought to excuse sloppy lawyering under the banner of environmen-
174. E.g., Cummington Preservation Comm'n v. FAA, 524 F.2d 241, 244 (1st Cir. 1975) (EIS need
discuss only reasonable alternatives); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engr's (Tennessee-
Tombigbee), 492 F.2d 1123, 1135-36 (5th Cir. 1974) (technically and economically speculative transporta-
tion alternative inappropriate for consideration in EIS on waterway project); Life of the Land v. Brinegar,
485 F.2d 460, 471-72 (9th Cir. 1973) (EIS need not consider alternative when its effect cannot be
reasonably ascertained and its implementation is remote and speculative), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974);
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Congress did not
intend that agencies consider remote alternatives, such as alternatives dependent on repeal of antitrust
laws).
175. Prior to Vermont Yankee, the energy conservation alternative had been considered in many impact
statements and required by several judicial decisions. See North Carolina v. FPC, 533 F.2d 702, 707 (D.C.
Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 429 U.S. 891 (1976); Cedar-Riverside Environmental
Defense Fund v. Hills, 422 F. Supp. 294, 313-15 (D. Minn. 1976); cf. County of Inyo v. City of Los
Angeles, 71 Cal. App. 3d 185, 203, 139 Cal. Rptr. 396, 408 (1977) (state law requires consideration of water
conservation alternative to groundwater extraction plans); 1977 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 77-514, § 2(b)(7) (to
be codified in CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-16(b)(7)) (EIS must address "the effect of the proposed action on
the use and conservation of energy resources").
176. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921
(1974).
177. 435 U.S. at 552-54.
178. The characterization is that of the court of appeals. Aeschliman v. NRC, 547 F.2d 622, 628 (D.C.
Cir. 1976).
179. See 435 U.S. at 552-55 (concept of alternatives is an evolving one, so court should judge agency's
decision in light of information originally available to agency); cf Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 405-
06 (1976) (counseling similar deference on statement timing).
180. See notes 150-51 supra and accompanying text.
181. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971); cf
Certified Color Mfrs. Ass'n v. Matthews, 543 F.2d 284, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (lower standard of proof
required when important health interests at stake).
182. Accord, Aberdeen & R. R.R. v. SCRAP (I), 409 U.S. 1207, 1217-18 (1972) (Burger, C.J., Circuit
Justice); see notes 183-86 infra and accompanying text.
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tal right, or create a new jurisprudence applicable to environmental cases
only. This trend is reflected in recent opinions withholding the hard look from
issues not raised with specificity below, 183 refusing broad injunctive relief
despite EIS deficiencies, 184 and reviving concepts of laches 185 and exhaustion
of administrative remedies 86 in environmental cases.
It always has been true that the intensity of the judicial hard look rewards
the ingenuity and force of the presentations of the parties before the
agencies. 187 Vermont Yankee says as much insofar as the discussion of
alternatives in the EIS is concerned. 188 But acceptance of the view that skill
and competence are amply rewarded does not undermine the special entitle-
ment of environmental claims to judicial protection. This status has origins
deep in the common law, 189 and finds expression in contemporary administra-
tive law addressing issues of health and safety. 90 The rapid evolution of the
hard look or close scrutiny doctrine has occurred mostly in environmental
and natural resource cases, 191 and for reasons quite understandable. Agency
decisions reallocating uses of valuable natural resources, affecting the health
of the population, and channeling the direction of future technologies are
remorseless in result, and deserving of the hard look before the long leap. 192
183. See Image of Greater San Antonio v. Brown, 570 F.2d 517, 523 (5th Cir. 1978) (failure of Air Force
to comply with its own regulations could not be considered on appeal because not raised below); North
Carolina v. FPC, 533 F.2d 702, 707 (D.C. Cir.) (issue not raised with sufficient specificity below), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 429 U.S. 891 (1976).
184. See Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (minor EIS deficiency must be balanced
against public interest; not every EIS deficiency calls for injunctive relief); Realty Income Trust v. Eckerd,
564 F.2d 447, 457-58 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (failure to file EIS on time did not warrant injunctive relief when
final EIS filed before construction was begun); Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld, 555 F.2d 817, 831
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (deficiencies in EIS for submarine base did not warrant delay in construction when delay
might injure national defense and deficiencies are remediable during construction).
185. Sworob v. Harris, 451 F. Supp. 96, 101-02 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (action to enjoin further construction of
townhouse project until EIS prepared barred by laches because plaintiffs waited eight years to file suit and
delay prejudiced defendant); Sierra Club v. Cavanaugh, 447 F. Supp. 427, 429-30 (D.S.D. 1978) (action to
enjoin further construction of and hookup to rural water system until EIS prepared barred by laches
because delay in bringing suit was inexcusable and prejudicial to defendants); Wioda v. United States, 446
F. Supp. 1377, 1390-91 (D. Minn. 1978) (when plaintiffs waited to file suit until after alleged deficient final
EIS was issued, route of high voltage transmission line designated, right-of-way acquired, and construction
commenced, action barred by laches); Organizations United for Ecology v. Bell, 446 F. Supp. 535, 544-53
(M.D. Pa. 1978) (action to enjoin construction and use of solid waste landfill at federal prison camp until
EIS prepared barred by laches because plaintiffs waited three years to file suit, delay in bringing action was
inexcusable, and prejudice to public interest by delay outweighed any prejudice caused by operation of the
landfill).
186. See Sierra Club v. ICC, 1978 Fed. Carr. Cas. 82,768, at 57,813-14 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Leventhal, J.,
dissenting) (objections to EIS should not be considered when they were not presented to agency).
187. See notes 68-70 supra and accompanying text.
188. 435 U.S. at 553.
189. See W. RODGERS, supra note 1, § 2.16 (discussing common law public trust doctrine, which deems
certain natural resources to be held in trust for public); Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource
Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970) (same).
190. See Certified Color Mfrs. Ass'n v. Matthews, 543 F.2d 284,297 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (lower standard of
proof required when important health interests at stake); Enviromental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus,
439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (personal interests in life, health, and liberty have always had special
claim to protection).
191. See notes 48-70 supra and accompanying text.
192. Professor Breyer opposes hard look review in nuclear licensing cases on the ground that the act of
licensing "is no more likely to injure health or the environment than failure" to license. Breyer, supra note
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The special status of environmental issues stems also from the recognition
that the public interest in them is often diffuse, abstract, and poorly
represented t93 Ultimately, the preferred status of environmental claims is
fixed by NEPA, which, even in hostile hands, must be read as laying down a
procedural agenda that profoundly modifies federal agency decisionmak-
ing.1
94
IV. THE SCOPE OF ALTERNATIVES PROPERLY ADDRESSED IN THE IMPACT
STATEMENT
As with its impact on the balls-and-strikes doctrine, Vermont Yankee's
effect on the scope of alternatives addressed in the EIS stems not so much
from the formulation adopted as the occasion for its announcement. The
Supreme Court embraces as its own t95 the rule of reason test of Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC) v. Morton. 196 That is, the EIS need
not address every alternative "thought conceivable by the mind of man"
197
but only those realistically available within the time frame of the proposal
being advanced.
The great strength of this test-its flexibility-is also its greatest weakness
as a vehicle for judicial enforcement of rigorous agency decisions. Vermont
Yankee identifies one vulnerability by affirming a threshold burden require-
ment that can be applied to excuse agency consideration of colorable, or
partial, alternatives.198 Another vulnerability, also picked up by the Supreme
Court, is that the "alternatives" that must be addressed in the EIS are ill-
1, at 1835. Surely the standard of review is not to be dictated by a preliminary determination of whether
health and safety claims have merit. Even if one accepts Professor Breyer's premise that the nuclear energy
alternative is generally preferable to coal, id. at 1835-38, close scrutiny is still in order to assure that adverse
effects are minimized and extraordinary risks exposed. See North Anna Environmental Coalition v. NRC,
533 F.2d 655 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (siting of nuclear reactors astride geological faults reviewed and upheld).
Congress has given the administrator freedom to assess the complex issues relating to the development of
nuclear power through the broadly written licensing provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §
2232 (1976), but the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is not excused from the now familiar demands of
hard look judicial review. Professor Breyer's further suggestion that any remand in Vermont Yankee
represents an unusually stringent application of the hard look, id. at 1833, 1840-41, slights the expansive
reach of the doctrine. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35-36 (D.C. Cir.) (searching and
careful review required of agency action, and agency must disclose its thinking in detail before adopting
rules), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688,
701 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975) (same); notes 49-76 supra and accompanying text.
193. Cf. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738-400 (1972) (only those directly injured as users have
standing to seek review of agency action affecting environment). The problem of underrepresentation is
aggravated by the decision in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 269-71 (1975)
(reading narrowly the circumstances in which attorney's fees may be rewarded in private litigation). See
generally Stewart, supra note 19, at 1713-16, 1756-1813 (critically analyzing problem of adequate
representation for all interests affected by agency decision).
194. See Lathan v. Brinegar (II), 506 F.2d 677, 693 (9th Cir. 1974) (the "history of environment" may
well prove to be "the history of observance of procedural safeguards") (quoting McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.)). See generally W. RODGERS, supra note 1, §§ 7.1, 7.3 (reviewing
scope and effect of NEPA).
195. 435 U.S. at 511.
196. 458 F.2d 827, 837-38 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
197. 435 U.S. at 551.
198. See notes 177-79 supra and accompanying text.
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defined and "evolving," so there is justification for the courts to defer to the
agencies' choice of options addressed in the impact statement. 199 So read, one
can conceive of invoking the NRDC v. Morton rule of reason test to excuse an
administrator from addressing each and every alternative required to be
addressed by the NRDC v. Morton opinion itself.
200
Another difficulty with Vermont Yankee's understanding of NEPA alter-
natives is that they are perceived as purely factual matters, subject to the
assignment of burdens and the recognition that a licensing board's decisions
must be judged by the information then available to it.201 In the case at hand,
information available to the licensing board in the early 1970's included
precious little about energy conservation. There is thus force in the suggestion
that the flaw in the court of appeals' approach in Vermont Yankee was not in
taking a hard look but in taking it from the perspective of Monday morning.
The question, however, is not whether the intervenors, the staff, or the board
are at fault for failing to address in depth what experience was yet to reveal. It
is whether the Court finds reason for administrative reconsideration at the
time it decides on the law then applicable.202 Judicial enforcement of a
constant administrative attention to the issue of facility need seems hardly out
of place, in light of NEPA's studied emphasis upon alternatives. This is
especially true if the question of alternatives is strictly a legal matter, which it
might very well be.
203
A partial answer to Vermont Yankee's determination to defer to the
agencies' perception of a workable alternative and the extent to which it will
be addressed is that NEPA itself mandates an in-depth assessment. The EIS
must be "detailed" in its discussion, 204 and the agency is obliged to "study,
develop and describe" appropriate alternatives.20 5 While not self-defining, the
concept of "alternative" is not without meaning, particularly in the context of
a concrete proposal. It includes, among other things, doing nothing,206 doing
199. 435 U.S. at 552-53.
200. The action proposed in that case was the leasing of tracts for offshore oil and gas development, and
the alternatives included executive elimination of oil import quotas, increased onshore exploration and
development, increased nuclear development, changes in FPC natural gas pricing and state prorationing,
but not the development of more speculative energy sources (such as geothermal and coal gasification). 458
F.2d at 829-30, 833-38.
201. 435 U.S. at 553.
202. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 77 (1975) (changes of law apply to pending cases); see Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 578 F.2d 337, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (court "cannot wear blinders in a
litigation involving an ongoing administrative process, and its rulings and relief must take account of the
world as it exists as of the time of the decree").
203. The fact-law distinction, to be sure, is one of the most treacherous in administrative law. See, e.g.,
Hanly v. Kleindienst (II), 471 F.2d 823, 828-30 (2d Cir. 1972) (discussing the scope of review of the NEPA
threshold question of whether an action is one "significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment"), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). The intensity ofjudicial review, in the context of major
facility construction, is likely to be influenced by the practical question of the extent of construction
allowed during the pendency of review proceedings.
204. 42 U.S.C. § 1332(2)(C) (1976).
205. Id. § 1332(2)(E).
206. See, e.g., Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693, 698 (2d Cir. 1972)
(abandonment of project must be considered as alternative); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Hughes, 451 F. Supp. 1245, 1264 (D.D.C. 1978) (alternative of doing nothing unavailable); cf. Alaska v.
Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (alternative of delay must be considered).
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something on a less bold scale,207 and doing it in a way that minimizes adverse
effects.208 If the definition of "alternative" under NEPA also is a legal issue, it
means that a court under the APA has full authority to review the agency
refusal to consider proposed alternatives.20 9 The argument that the agency
expertise ought to inform the content of the legal term210 breaks down in the
NEPA context when the agency may be both inexpert in, and hostile to, the
environmental considerations. 211 The NRC's views on energy conservation
ought to carry as much weight with the courts as, let us say, the ICC's
assessment of fusion power.
Vermont Yankee asserts that the question of the need for Consumers
Power's nuclear plant is assigned initially to state public utility commissions,
with the NRC functioning primarily in the area of public health and safety.
212
The Court then states that the obligation to consider alternatives under
NEPA "has altered slightly the statutory balance" 213-a clearly disparaging
view of NEPA's unvarnished invitation to conclude there is no need. This is a
judicial judgment reflecting a deference to the agency choice of burdens and
sense of significance; it is not a legislative direction that compels the
conclusion that the "statutory balance" of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is
not much affected by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970.
There is no more important aspect of NEPA than the obligation to discuss
the alternatives of no action, of lesser action, and of an action with mitigation.
Any court-ordered change in the agency course, through substantive review
whether under NEPA or a complementary statute,214 is utterly dependent
upon the depth of assessment of these other ways of doing things. Vermont
Yankee announces no change in the accepted obligation to address real and
workable alternatives. But the agencies, never enthusiastic about writing self-
destruct mechanisms into their own proposals, will be quick to detect in the
decision a softening of the judicial oversight that makes the obligation to
evaluate the unthinkable a real one.
CONCLUSION
It is easy enough to overreact to Vermont Yankee. The decision, after all,
confirms a variety of accepted legal propositions-the procedural dominance
207. See, e.g., Farwell v. Brinegar, 3 Envir. Rep. Cas. 20,881, 20,885 (W.D. Wis. 1973) (upgrading
existing road must be considered as alternative to building new road).
208. See, e.g., Simmans v. Grant, 370 F. Supp. 5, 18 (S.D. Tex. 1974) (mitigation measures must be
considered in EIS). See generally Note, supra note 87 (arguing that NEPA requires agencies to adopt the
least adverse alternative).
209. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (C), (D) (1976).
210. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944); cf. Train v. Natural Resource
Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 87 (1975) (EPA's interpretation of environmental statute given weight).
211. See Leventhal, supra note 129, at 523 (court should be skeptical and insist on justification of agency
position when nonenvironmental agency downplays environmental consequences of its actions).
212. 435 U.S. at 519, 550; see 42 U.S.C. § 2021(K) (1976) (federal preemption of state laws limited to
protection against radiation hazard).
213. 435 U.S. at 551.
214. See W. RODGERS, supra note 1, § 7.12 (substantive review under NEPA and complementary
statute); notes 81-102 supra and accompanying text (substantive review underNEPA),
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of NEPA, congressional authority over agency procedures, the definitions of
the intervenors' threshold burden and of the scope of alternatives that must be
addressed in the impact statement. The decision is out of step, nonetheless,
with the dominant strains of the close scrutiny doctrine that has become
synonymous with contemporary judicial review of technological decision-
making by the agencies. For this reason, Vermont Yankee is likely to be
isolated and confined; the banishment of the decision should not be greatly
mourned.

